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Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

Teresa Kouri Kissel

Abstract: This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into
account the way the logical connectives shift depending on the context in which they occur.
Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify
the contextual factor which is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the
meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest
that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavor. Questions about the meanings of the
connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.
Keywords: Logical pluralism; Questions Under Discussion; Connectives; Carnap; Polysemy

1. Introduction
There are several options for logical pluralism on the table. This paper presents a view of
logical pluralism which can account for the fact that there are some contexts in which distinct
logics have logical terms which are synonymous, and some contexts in which distinct logics
have logical terms which are not synonymous. None of the logical pluralisms on the table can
accommodate this. I will discuss the factor which affects the meanings of the logical
connectives, and then sketch an account of such meanings which works in light of this factor.
Ultimately, I will suggest that we cannot ask about the meanings of the logical connectives
outside of a context, as doing so is asking an external question, in the Carnapian sense, and is
illegitimate.
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2. The Intuitions
There are two particular conversational thought experiments I will focus on throughout this
paper. In both conversations, two participants are discussing two analysis systems: classical
analysis (CA) and smooth infinitesimal analysis (SIA). Briefly, SIA is an intuitionistic
analysis system, in which all functions are smooth. Importantly, it is such that 0 is not the
only nilsquare (a nilsquare is an element whose square is zero, i.e. elements 𝑥 such that 𝑥 2 =
0). This is because every function is linear on the nilsquares. From this, it is provable that 0 is
not the only nilsquare even though ‘there are nilsquares distinct from 0’ leads to a
contradiction. This would be inconsistent in classical logic (because of the validity of the law
of excluded middle), and so intuitionistic logic is required.1
The conversations we are interested in are as follows.
Conversation 1: Here, the participants are discussing the two analysis systems in a classroom
setting.
Rudolf: In my system, I can prove the fundamental theorem of the calculus. Does
your system prove it?
Geoffrey: I can prove a version of the fundamental theorem, too. I use nilsquares,
numbers whose square is 0. They are not distinct from 0, but it is also the case that 0
is not the only one!
Rudolf: What? Such nilsquares cannot exist. There is only one nilsquare and it is 0.
Geoffrey: Well, using your negation, sure.
Rudolf: Oh, I see. Your negation must behave differently from mine.

1

See Bell [1998] for more details.
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Conversation 2: Again, the participants are discussing the two analysis systems in a
classroom setting.
JC: In my system the fundamental theorem of the calculus holds. Does it hold in
yours?
Greg: In mine too. I use non-trivial nilsquares to prove it.
JC: There are no non-trivial nilsquares in my system. Interesting. We both prove the
same thing differently.
Intuitively, in both conversations, two logics are in play: the logic of CA, classical logic, and
the logic of SIA, intuitionistic logic. In Conversation 1, between Rudolf and Geoffrey, the
logical connectives in each logic in question seem to mean something different (the
participants even suggest as much, stating that the negations must be different). In
Conversation 2, they mean the same thing. At the very least, JC and Greg seem to be talking
about the same fundamental theorem. If the theorems are the same, then the logical
terminology in the formal statements of the fundamental theorems must have the same
meaning.
In the next sections, I will develop a method for accounting for both conversations, and show
how we can account for the change in connective meaning by a contextual factor. I will then
sketch an account of meaning which accords well with this shift, and suggests that this fits
well with the way Carnap might have thought about things. Finally, I will address several
objections.

3. The New System
I will use Roberts’s Question Under Discussion (QUD) framework to analyze these
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conversations. I will show that the factor which affects whether two connectives mean the
same thing is whether the assumption that ‘if two words sound alike, are spelled the same
way, and are generally used in the same sentences in the same way then they mean the same
thing’ can be preserved in the common ground. I call this the ‘correlation as identity
proposition’, or 𝐶𝐼𝑃. 𝐶𝐼𝑃 is a default for most conversations, and like any default, it can be
given up. Conversations where 𝐶𝐼𝑃 is part of the common ground are conversations where
the logical connectives mean the same thing. Conversations where CIP cannot be part of the
common ground are conversations where the logical connectives can mean something
different. It is important to note that the conversations I will discuss have three important
features. The conversations I consider are all ‘deductive conversations’. These are
conversations about deductive reasoning or where the participants are doing or discussing
deductive reasoning. Lectures in a typical mathematics class count, as does a mathematician
working out a proof by herself on a blackboard. Anything that can be construed as the
exchange of mathematical or deductive information between a speaker and an audience, even
including those cases in which the speaker is the sole audience member, is a deductive
conversation.
Additionally, I will assume that the conversational contexts are sufficiently regimented to
carry the appropriate logics with them. This will help give us a transcription between the
natural language conversation and a formal language counterpart for each deductive
conversation. In most cases, this will be simple enough, at least for the object level assertions
within a conversation.2 For example, in conversation 1, the statements ‘such nilsquares
cannot exist’ and ‘there is only one nilsquare and it is 0’ will be easily transcribable. The

2
It is not clear that the object-level transcription will always be so easy. Field [2009: 346-7] provides an
example where translating negation into formal language is quite complicated. I ignore this complication
here.
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meta-theoretic claims, though, will pose a further problem: it is not at all clear how to
transcribe claims like ‘Your negation must behave differently from mine’ and ‘Using your
negation, sure’.
The biggest problem in attempting to transcribe the meta-language claims is that the
connectives are both used and mentioned in the meta-language. I will assume that the
conversational participants in each conversation are using the same meta-language
connectives. In the conversations, the meta-theoretic statements merely serve as signposts
about what to expect the meanings of the connectives to be in such a context. This allows us
to focus explicitly on the meanings of the connectives and logical terminology in the
mathematical systems in question, while using the semantic claims as guides for how the
conversational participants might charitably interpret and accommodate each other’s
utterances.
Finally, I will assume that something like a principle of charity and accommodation is in play.
Each conversational participant is meant to be as charitable as possible to each other
participant. For example, if it looks like a participant has uttered something irrational or
unjustifiable, the remaining participants are obliged to do everything they can to rationalize
the utterance. Participants must accommodate as much as possible to ensure they do not have
to believe their fellow participants are irrational. For more details, see Grice [1969] and
Lewis [1979].
The requirement of charity is very much in line with the Hilbertian perspective of Shapiro
[2004]. The Hilbertian perspective, roughly, is the position that most mathematical theories,
so far as they are coherent, are legitimate. Here, Shapiro and I share a similar point of view:
so long as a deductive utterance can be accommodated, it can be seen to be coming from the
perspective of a legitimate logical theory. One major difference between the Shapiro position
5

and the position advocated here is that the QUD framework can be extended beyond
mathematical contexts. One can think of this new view either as an extension of the Shapiro
point of view to contexts which involve more than just mathematics, or as a combination of
the views taken to be held by Carnap [1937] and Beall & Restall [2006]. Shapiro holds the
view that the meanings of the logical connectives can shift from one mathematical context to
another, and moreover that ‘means the same thing as’ is vague, so that sometimes the
classical and intuitionist connectives mean the same thing while sometimes they do not.
Carnap and Beall & Restall, on the other hand, each seem to hold the opposite ends of this
view. On the face of it, Carnap holds that connectives in different logics can never share a
meaning, while Beall & Restall hold that they always do.

3.1

QUD framework

The framework I will consider is a direct adaptation of the system in Roberts [2012] provided
by for analyzing natural language conversations. The formal details are available in the
Appendix. The system has a typical Common Ground (𝐶𝐺) (which contains the propositions
the participants are agreeing to treat as true for the purposes of the conversation), and an
additional resource for tracking the knowledge and goals of the interlocutors: a list of
questions under discussion, 𝑄𝑈𝐷. Questions are added to 𝑄𝑈𝐷 when all interlocutors agree
that their conversation goal is to answer a question, and removed from 𝑄𝑈𝐷 when a
satisfactory answer is provided, or the question is deemed to be unanswerable.
We need to make two small changes to this framework to make it suit our purpose. First,
Roberts [2012] discusses the system with respect to propositions. However, I will use the
term ‘proposition’ only roughly, for something like a formalized sentence, in order to avoid
having to make substantial (controversial) claims about just what propositions are. This
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pluralism can be made to fit many views about the nature of propositions. Second, it is
ordinarily assumed that 𝐶𝐺 cannot entail an answer to a question for that question to be
legitimate, and added to 𝑄𝑈𝐷. We will not assume that here. If we couldn’t add questions
whose answer were entailed by 𝐶𝐺, then when our common ground includes the axioms for a
theory, we would not be able to ask any question about what that theory entails. Rather, we
will assume that if 𝐶𝐺 entails an answer to such a question from an available set of
assumptions, then that question cannot be added to 𝑄𝑈𝐷. The term ‘available’ here has been
adapted from Stalnaker [2014: 24]. There, he uses it to pick out those propositions which are
currently being entertained by the conversational participants, and ‘easy’ to infer, where what
is easily inferable is something like ‘not taking too many steps’ or ‘being well within the
abilities of the conversational participants to deduce’. What propositions are available will be,
in most cases, a context sensitive matter.
The conversations as described above fall into one of two categories: conversations where
𝐶𝐼𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐺 and conversations where the interlocutors are forced to remove 𝐶𝐼𝑃 from 𝐶𝐺.3 In
the first case, the logics in play in the conversation will have connectives which mean the
same thing. In the second case, the logics in play in the conversation may have connectives
which do not share meanings.
This will roughly line up with the framework in Shapiro [2014]. I suspect that his ‘logical’
contexts will usually correspond to contexts in which we must remove 𝐶𝐼𝑃 from 𝐶𝐺, and that
his ‘mathematical’ contexts will usually correspond to the contexts in which we can leave
𝐶𝐼𝑃 in place. This may not always happen. For example, though CA proves the intermediate

Whether 𝐶𝐼𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐺 does not affect the status of the proposition expressed by 𝐶𝐼𝑃 as true or false, but
only whether the conversational participants are treating it as true for the purposes of the conversation. This
means that the theory I’m giving here is a pragmatic theory. In section 4.2, I will suggest that there is no
further theory to provide. Thanks to a referee for pushing me on this issue.
3
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value theorem, SIA does not. On my view, it would be possible for a conversation between
two people about the intermediate value theorem to be one in which we must remove
𝐶𝐼𝑃 from 𝐶𝐺, which would result in a conversation where the corresponding connectives
might not share a meaning, and where the intermediate value theorems in each system were
not the same. This would not be a natural occurrence on Shapiro’s view.

3.2 Conversation 1
In conversation 1, Rudolf and Geoffrey are discussing their two analysis systems. One
possible question in this conversation is ‘in each system, do there exist types of things which
are not distinct from 0, but such that 0 is not the only one?’. Another is something like ‘what
is consistent in your system given the meaning of your negation?’.
Intuitively, if we assumed that both participants would interpret themselves as using the same
connectives, we would have a problem with charity and accommodation. Geoffrey has
uttered something which can be taken to imply the negation of a classical truth. His utterance
can be taken to imply that there exists some non-singleton, non-empty, set of things which are
not distinct from 0. Since the double negation cancels in classical logic, this is equivalent to
saying that these things both are and are not distinct from 0 for the classical analyst, a clear
contradiction. Adding the existence of these types of nilsquares to a classical system will
result in a contradiction. Rudolf cannot accept the existence of these objects and maintain a
consistent theory. If the conversation continues after the existence of such nilsquares is
posited (and not just by a simple ‘no’ from Rudolf), then we must assume that Rudolf is
assuming that Geoffrey is using a different negation. So, the most charitable interpretation of
this conversation is one in which the negation connectives have different meanings.
The story in Roberts’s system works out the same way. What we wind up showing is that the
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presupposition that the connective meanings were shared is what makes the original
𝐶𝐺 defective. The conversation proceeds as normal (in fact, the first two utterances in both
conversations are incredibly similar) until Rudolf challenges Geoffrey with another question:
a question expressing skepticism about the possibility of nilsquares, perhaps something like
‘how is it that your nilsquares exist without contradiction?’. This is a clarification question, a
meta-linguistic question which signals a request for more information (see Ginzburg [2012]
for a description of clarification questions). It indicates, in effect, that something has gone
wrong in the conversation which Rudolf does not understand.
This should not be unexpected, either. Geoffrey has already hedged about exactly what it is
he proved. In suggesting ‘a version of the fundamental theorem’, he hedges about whether or
not it is actually the same theorem. It seems Geoffrey knows in advance that he is going to
run into problems with Rudolf’s understanding of his claims about nilsquares. He could have
simply responded ‘yes, I prove that theorem, too’, but rather chose to supplement with
additional information. This strongly suggests that Geoffrey anticipated Rudolf’s clarification
question.
In order to answer the clarification question, Geoffrey suggests that the negations in question
must be different, which Rudolf accepts with his final contribution to the conversation. Here,
we must make a change to 𝐶𝐺. Since we assumed that 𝐶𝐼𝑃 was in 𝐶𝐺 from the beginning,
then this is what we have to change. The default is that these words have the same meaning,
until we are put into a position where the only way to accommodate the differences is to
assume that they do not. The way Rudolf and Geoffrey have to accommodate each other is by
adding to the common ground that the connectives in question actually mean something
different, even though they sound/look the same.
This shows us that the original common ground was defective. When the original question
9

‘does your system prove the fundamental theorem?’ is posed, Rudolf is assuming that both he
and Geoffrey are talking about the same fundamental theorem, and are therefore both looking
for an answer to a single question. This cannot be the case. They must both prove a very
closely related thing, though not exactly the same thing. They are discussing near
translational equivalents. This is an effect of the common ground originally containing
𝐶𝐼𝑃 and the forced removal of it. 4
In the appendix, I provide a formalization of this conversation in the Roberts framework.

3.3 Conversation 2
In conversation 2, JC and Greg, are seeing what is common to their two theories. Here, one of
the questions is something like ‘what tools does each system use to prove the FTC?’. JC and
Greg are behaving as though there is one fundamental theorem which they both prove. If we
think that the statements of the fundamental theorem mean the same thing, then because those
statements contain logical operators, those operators must mean the same thing as well. This
means that we have to treat the connectives as meaning the same thing. However, it still
requires two distinct logical systems: one which licenses non-trivial nilsquares and one which
does not.
Importantly, nothing flags the common ground as defective. We are given no reason to
change the assumption that 𝐶𝐼𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐺, and so there is no need to do so.5

One possibility not addressed here is that ‘in my system’ is something more like ‘in my book’. In this
way, we might liken the debate between Geoffrey and Rudolf to a debate between two historians wondering
about the nature of Cleopatra (this example and issue are due to a referee). Certainly, if two historians were
disagreeing about Cleopatra, we would not want to interpret them as discussing two distinct historical
figures. We might think the same should be true for the logical case. However, in the logical cases, we
cannot point to historical records or relics, but only to the behaviors of the conversational participants and
the rules and/or truth conditions they profess to associate with each connective. Thus, it makes more sense to
let how many connectives are (pragmatically) in play be guided by the behavior of the participants.
5
One thing to notice here is that if this conversation continued, it is distinctly possible that Greg’s next
utterance would be something like ‘You must mean something different by “proof” than I do.’ In this case, it
4
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In the appendix I provide the formalization of this conversation in the Roberts framework,
where the results are as expected.

3.3 The Factor Affecting Connective Meanings
So far, so good. What is important for this project is the following: whether 𝐶𝐼𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐺 can
directly affect the meanings of the logical connectives in question.
When 𝐶𝐼𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐺 the logical connectives mean the same thing across different logics, while if
the interlocutors are forced to remove 𝐶𝐼𝑃from 𝐶𝐺, the assumption that the connectives must
mean the same thing is given up. The factor responsible for the intuitions in section 2 is the
presence or absence of 𝐶𝐼𝑃 from 𝐶𝐺 at the time we are assessing whether the connectives
share a meaning.6

4 A New Theory of Connective Meaning
We need an account of the meaning of negation (and the rest of the connectives) which can be

would be possible that we would have to remove 𝐶𝐼𝑃 from the common ground, but that it would not affect
the meanings of the logical connectives, but rather the meaning of ‘proof’. This is interesting, since it shows
two things. First, it makes explicit the fact that there are two logics in play in the conversation. Second, it
shows that 𝐶𝐼𝑃does not need to be restricted to just the logical connectives, but can affect much of what is
going on in the conversation. One particularly interesting aspect of this lack of restriction is that rather than
different connectives being in operation, it might be different standards of implication (thanks to a referee for
this suggestion). Terrés Villalonga [forthcoming] and Caret [forthcoming] each propose a view where the
standards of implication might shift in a way that has nothing to do with connective meanings. I have not
addressed whether the standards of implication are the same across both conversations. It seems likely that
each conversation has two standards of implication in play, but whether both standards in conversation 1 are
the same as both standards in conversation two is another question. I suspect that we will find that we cannot
compare the standards across the conversations without embedding them into the appropriate context. A full
examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
6
I need to give a story about what happens in ‘mixed’ conversations. That is, what happens in
conversation where 𝐶𝐼𝑃 cannot be part of the common ground at a certain point, but can be part of the
common ground before and after that point. We ought to maintain that if 𝐶𝐼𝑃 is removed from the common
ground and then ‘added back’ that the meanings of the connectives or ‘proves’ might change throughout the
conversation. This means that any time a new goal becomes salient, the status of 𝐶𝐼𝑃 might change. But this
is to be expected. We can account for the purpose of a conversation in terms of the conversational goals.
Thus, since we have been maintaining that the right logic and meanings of the connectives are relative to a
purpose and a context, so we ought to accept that when out purpose changes, sometimes the meanings will
change.
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treated in such a loose way. I sketch a possibility in this section to show that there is logical
space for such a theory of meaning, and draw some conclusions about it.

4.1 Connective Meanings as Polysemous
There is something it seems everyone is after when they claim to have provided a new formal
definition of negation. This is true not only for the classical logician, the intuitionist and the
relevance logician, but also the linear logician, the dialetheic logician, etc. I claim that they
are all, roughly, after the same thing, which we might call ‘pre-theoretic negation’, and the
concepts they wind up arriving at are related to each other in a polysemous way.7 We might
also call this a ‘fluid concept’, in the sense of Lynch [1998]. There, he states that ‘the search
for the essence or common property expressed by a [fluid] concept is futile’ [Lynch 1998:
62].
We have some idea of what ‘pre-theoretic negation’ might be, but giving any more than
broad-stroke descriptions of it is impossible. This puts ‘pre-theoretic negation’ the weird
position of being neither a natural nor formal language negation; it is not robust enough to be
used effectively in conversation nor to stand in logical relationships to other connectives.
It is natural to think that pre-theoretic negation might be defined by a single model-theoretic
or proof theoretic clause. Perhaps a model-theoretic clause, like minimal truth conditions, in
the sense of Restall [2002], or the claims developed in Hjortland [2013] would do the trick. It
should be clear, though, that not all negation clauses will fit this mold. What of those which
can only be defined relative to a proof theory, for example? If we start with a proof-theoretic

Two words are polysemous when they are ambiguous but related. So, while ‘bat’ is ambiguous
between the mammal and the baseball equipment, it is not polysemous. On the other hand, ‘wood’ is
ambiguous between the thing trees are made of and the thing a lot of trees make up, they are related to each
other, and so are polysemous. I will make no claims here about whether all polysemous words are always
related by a ‘pre-theoretic’ notion.
7
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clause, we have a similar problem: our pre-theoretic meaning of negation will not be able to
accommodate negation in logics which are exclusively model-theoretic. However, there is
something common to the clauses given by the model-theorist and the proof-theorist: they are
both precisifications of the pre-theoretic meaning. This claim is further supported by the fact
that a person using one of them may very well be understood by a person using another. In
the terms we used earlier, they are logical terms which usually abide by the antecedent of
𝐶𝐼𝑃. This is the sense in which they are polysemous.
The interesting feature of the 𝑄𝑈𝐷 system is that we can use the conversational goals and
questions under discussion to resolve much of the polysemy. Questions under discussion are
excellent tools for helping to identify the topic of any given conversation. Once we identify
just what it is we are talking about, we can identify which precisification of negation is in
play. For example, if we are talking about or doing classical mathematics, then we can safely
say that we are using classical negation. However, if we are talking about or doing non-trivial
naive set theory, we can safely say we are using a paraconsistent negation. Further, this
allows us to make sense of some additional intuitions. In the two conversations above, it was
easy for the conversations to continue either by removing 𝐶𝐼𝑃 from 𝐶𝐺, or assuming that the
negations in question were the same. However, imagine a similar conversation, but this time
between a classical logician and a dialetheist. It seems in this conversation, when the
classicist discovers that her interlocutor is using a negation with which both 𝐴and ¬𝐴 can be
true, she is allowed to claim that she does not know whether that negation means the same
thing as hers. In this case, it seems possible that the ways each participant has spelled out the
pre-theoretic meaning of the connective are just too far apart to make sense of together.
Polysemy presents us with a nice option in logical space. Section 3 showed that connective
meanings can vary from context to context. However, without some general idea of what
13

makes some formal negation connective a negation rather than disjunction, and some idea of
what types of things can shift from context to context, the results of section 3 would be
impeded. The story about polysemy and pre-theoretic negation shows that both requirements
can be fulfilled, and so the results in section 3 are left intact.

4.2 Real Meaning as an External Question
Here, then, we have a system which governs the pragmatic story of when two connectives
share a meaning. It does not address the question of whether any two sentences involving
negation really mean the same thing. ‘Pre-theoretic negation’ is not a robust enough notion of
‘same meaning’ to do any significant work. No logic will flow from the pre-theoretic
meaning; it is simply too thin to stand in any logical relation to the pre-theoretic meaning of
the other connectives. In the Carnapian sense, I claim that real meaning questions, asked
outside of an appropriate context, are external and illegitimate.
For Carnap, a non-theoretical question is one asked about reality itself; it is external to any
given framework (see Carnap [1950]). There are two types of external questions: pragmatic
questions and pseudo-questions. A pragmatic question is a question about which framework
is best for a given purpose, and can be answered.8 Pseudo-questions (non-pragmatic external
questions) cannot be answered, on Carnap’s view, and this is the sense in which they are
illegitimate. Examples of pseudo-questions include questions of existence of abstract objects,
which can only be answered relative to a given linguistic framework, and questions about the
right logic. Outside of a linguistic framework questions like this are only pseudo-questions.
So it goes, I claim, for questions of the real meanings of the logical connectives. They are

8
See Steinberger [2016] for an interesting discussion about how pragmatically to select the appropriate
linguistic framework.
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like questions of the existence of abstract objects. We do not have enough information outside
of an appropriate context to know precisely what they mean. We simply cannot ask that
question and expect an answer.
We can ask instead about when two connectives, as they are spelled out in a context, share a
meaning robust enough to be logical. Two sentences involving negation cannot be said to
share a logical meaning simpliciter, because then we would have to ask whether they share a
logical meaning without some conversational goal guiding our inquiry. But without such a
goal, or a determination of the status of 𝐶𝐼𝑃, we do not know anything but the pre-theoretic
meanings of the connectives.
More generally, what I have proposed is that logical connectives simply have no robust
meaning outside of their meaning in a context. This means that the question of the meaning
of the logical connectives, when asked without a purpose or application of the logic in mind,
are unanswerable. Here, we have extended the Carnapian picture: not only is it illegitimate to
ask for the right logic outside of a pragmatic structure, it is also illegitimate to ask for the
meanings of the logical connectives for any particular logic outside of a context. Without a
context, without a goal, we can have no logical meaning. Once we fill out these details, we
are at liberty to ‘build up [our] own logic’ [Carnap 1937: 52], to preach Carnapian tolerance,
and moreover, we can build that logic so that it shares connectives with another, or so that it
does not. The Carnapian slogan becomes ‘in logic [and connective meanings,] there are no
morals’ [Carnap 1937: 52].

5 Objections and Replies
Objection: What is the difference between this view and a view that claims that the meanings
of the logical connectives are ambiguous? Why posit polysemy at all?
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Reply: Though the polysemy view about the meanings of the connectives is indeed a type of
ambiguity view about those meanings, there is an additional benefit to positing polysemy
rather than mere ambiguity. That benefit is that this view can better make sense of
disagreements, and with that, it can make sense of what Plunkett and Sundell [2013] and
Thomasson [2016] call ‘metalinguistic negotiation’. With mere ambiguity, there is no clear
answer to what people disagree about when they argue over the meanings of the logical
connectives. With polysemy, there is. Those in disagreements over the meanings of the
logical connectives can be said to be disagreeing over the pre-theoretic meaning of each
connective. The position I present does hold that they are wrong to do so outside of a
properly constructed context, but they may nonetheless be engaged in such a disagreement.
This benefit also allows us to make sense of meta-linguistic negotiations, which Plunkett and
Sundell [2013: 3] define as ‘disagreement[s] about the proper deployment of linguistic
representations’. Metalinguistic negotiations are exactly the kind of thing that Geoffrey and
Rudolf are engaged in when they decide they must each be using different versions of the
connectives; they disagree about how to use the connective, and then come to a negotiated
conclusion about what it means when each of them uses it. If the connectives were merely
ambiguous, we would not see this type of behavior, since there would be nothing in common
between the connectives which we could pick out as the thing the participants were
negotiating the use of.
Further, this use of polysemy rather than ambiguity has an important impact on an argument
often provided against pluralism. Opponents of pluralism often suggest that logical
disagreement is not possible when logical pluralism is on the table, since people using
different logics are talking past each other, and having a merely verbal dispute (Quine [1986]

16

might be thought of as a making an argument of this type).9 This would be bad for the
pluralist, as it seems genuine logical disagreement is possible. The adoption of a view of
connective meanings on which they are polysemous and related by sharing a pre-theoretic
meaning solves this problem. We find that genuine logical disagreement is indeed possible. In
the case where 𝐶𝐼𝑃 is removed from 𝐶𝐺 and there is more than one meaning for negation in
use in the conversation, this disagreement would be a pragmatic and external disagreement
about which connective it is best to use. It becomes a metalinguistic negotiation about which
extension of the pre-theoretic meaning of negation is best for the purpose at hand. On the
other hand, when 𝐶𝐼𝑃 remains in 𝐶𝐺, and the interlocutors are using the same connectives,
they can still have genuine logical disagreement. This case is easier, though, since there is
little chance the interlocutors accidentally talk past each other as they are using connectives
with the same meaning. This means, quite interestingly, that a difference in meaning does not
necessarily lead to a verbal dispute. Substantive disagreement is possible even when
conversational participants are using terms with different meanings. For a further
development of this point, see Wyatt and Payette [forthcoming].
Objection: Formal language connectives mean just what they are formally defined to mean,
and there is no context sensitivity there. Without such formal language context sensitivity you
have not really shown that whether two formal language connectives mean the same thing is
a context sensitive matter, as you claim.10
Reply: In a sense, this objection is correct. If the formal connectives are explicitly defined by
the conversational participants, and those definitions are part of 𝐶𝐺, then there will be no
context sensitivity at the formal level. We will be left merely with natural language context

9
Thanks to a referee for raising this concern, and suggesting that different meanings do not necessarily
lead to merely verbal disputes.
10
Thanks to a referee for suggesting this line of attack.
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sensitivity, and the question of whether the natural language connectives have the meanings
ascribed to the formal language connectives in 𝐶𝐺.
However, the more interesting cases, and the two cases described in conversation 1 and 2, do
not have definitions of the formal language connectives in 𝐶𝐺.11 Because of this, the formal
connective meanings themselves are up for grabs. In conversation 1, the only constraints on
such meanings is that there must be two sets for each logic, and that Rudolf and Geoffrey are
using distinct meanings. This gives us several options: perhaps we have truth conditions and
inferential roles, and Rudolf is using truth conditional meanings and Geoffrey inferential
roles. Or perhaps Rudolf is using natural deduction rules to define his connectives, and
Geoffrey is using proof-conditions. Nothing about the conversation so far settles this
question, and so what exactly the formal connectives mean is up for debate. Because of this
openness we can say that the formal language meanings of the connectives are contextual in
the same way ‘red’ might be. In some contexts the meaning of ‘red’ is underspecified.
Sometimes two people might disagree over whether something is red, and there may be two
distinct meanings floating about. One might mean by ‘red’ ‘things with wavelengths between
640 and 660’ and the other might mean ‘things with wavelengths between 600 and 700’. The
context may not settle the answer, but might tell us whether one or two specific meanings are
in play. It is the same with the formal language connective meanings: if no explicit meanings
are added to 𝐶𝐺, then the specific meanings are up for grabs and can be more or less settled
by the context. This makes the formal language connective meanings, in addition to the
natural language connective meanings, contextually dependent, as required.

11
This way of thinking about the situation does require us to separate the formal connective meanings
from the logical rules. On this picture, the rules in a logic for a particular connective do not necessarily fully
specify the meaning of that connective.
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Objection: Your proposal about connective meanings is vague and needs more details.
Reply: This is unavoidable. The very point of the proposal is that the meanings of the
connectives are a hazy matter. We find that any time we settle on one meaning more specific
than ‘somehow closely related to the accepted clauses’ or ‘sharing a family resemblance’, we
rule out some things we would want to count as negation, and allow some things we would
not. For further work on this ruling in and ruling out problem see Kouri [2016], Priest [1987],
and Hjortland [2013]. This makes sense of our intuitions that we can only find robust
meanings of connectives within a specified context, and that the connectives are fluid, in the
sense of Lynch [1998]. Adding more precision to the proposal would prevent this fluidity and
context sensitivity.

6 Conclusion
I have shown how one can construct a logical pluralism which relies on the linguistic system
presented in Roberts [2012] which makes sense of conversations 1 and 2, and which can be
easily extended beyond mathematical contexts. On this view, sometimes the logical
connectives in such a conversation have the same meaning, and sometimes they have
pairwise distinct meanings. Questions about the meanings of the logical connectives cannot
be asked outside of a context of use. Such questions are illegitimate; they are Carnapian
pseudo-questions.

Acknowledgements: I owe a debt of gratitude to Stewart Shapiro, who read many early
drafts. I am grateful for comments on previous drafts from Ethan Baruer, Roy Cook, Geoffrey
Hellman, Hannes Leitgeb, Chris Pincock, Craige Roberts, Marcus Rossberg, Gil Sagi,
Giorgio Sbardollini, Kevin Scharp, and Neil Tennant, as well as several referees.
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Appendix
The Roberts [2012] framework is given formally by the following.
1. 𝐼: the set of interlocutors at time 𝑡
2. 𝐺: a function from pairs of individuals in 𝐼 and times 𝑡 to sets of goals in effect at
𝑡 such that for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 and each 𝑡, there is a set 𝐺(𝑖, 𝑡) which is 𝑖’s set of goals at 𝑡
3. 𝐺𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 : the set of common goals at 𝑡; i.e. {𝑔|∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺(𝑖, 𝑡)}
4. 𝑀: the set of moves made by interlocutors up to 𝑡 with the following distinguished
subsets: 𝐴, the set of assertions, 𝑄, the set of questions, 𝑅, the set of requests, and
𝐴𝑐𝑐, the set of accepted moves
5. ≤: a total order on 𝑀 that reflects the chronological order of moves
6. 𝐶𝐺: the common ground; i.e. the set of shared presupposed propositions at 𝑡
7. 𝑄𝑈𝐷: the set of questions under discussion at 𝑡; i.e. a subset of 𝑄 ∩ 𝐴𝑐𝑐 such that for
all 𝑞 ∈ 𝑄𝑈𝐷, CG does not entail an answer to 𝑞 and the goal of answering 𝑞 is a
common goal
The conversational score is updated as follows:
1. Assertion: if an assertion is accepted by all interlocutors, then the proposition asserted
is added to 𝐶𝐺 and 𝐴𝑐𝑐
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2. Question: if a question is accepted by all interlocutors, then the set of propositions
associated with the question is added to QUD. A question is removed from QUD if
and only if either its answer is entailed by 𝐶𝐺 or it is determined to be unanswerable
3. Request: if a request is accepted by an interlocutor, 𝑖, then the goal associated with the
request is added to 𝐺(𝑖, 𝑡) and the proposition that 𝑖intends to comply with the request
is added to 𝐶𝐺
Formalization of Conversation 1
I assume that 𝑡0 is the time before the first utterance, 𝑡1 the time of the first utterance and
𝑡5 the time of the last. I is {Rudolf, Geoffrey}. At 𝑡0 , 𝐶𝐺 includes the axioms of classical
analysis, and the 𝐶𝐼𝑃. One might have thought that the axioms of SIA, and the fact that SIA
uses intuitionistic logic, would also be included in 𝐶𝐺 at 𝑡0 . However, it seems clear,
especially given Geoffrey’s hedge and supplementing with additional information, that
though Geoffrey knows the axioms, Rudolf does not, and it is common knowledge that
Rudolf does not. Thus, they are not candidates to be included in 𝐶𝐺. 𝐺𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 , 𝑀, 𝐴, 𝑄, 𝑄𝑈𝐷,
and 𝐴𝑐𝑐 are empty.
At 𝑡1 , Rudolf promotes the proposition that his system proves the fundamental theorem to a
simple, clear and straightforward implication in 𝐶𝐺, 𝐴 and 𝐴𝑐𝑐. At the same time, he adds to
𝑄 the question of whether the other system proves the theorem. It also gets added to 𝑄𝑈𝐷,
since in this context, even though 𝐶𝐺 implies it, it is not yet an available implication.
Rudolf’s goals at 𝑡1 include finding out whether Geoffrey’s system proves the theorem.
At 𝑡2 , Geoffrey answers the question by claiming that the other system proves a version of
the fundamental theorem. Additionally, Geoffrey attempts to add new information to the CG:
that his system uses nilsquares to prove this theorem. He also proposes to add to 𝐶𝐺 and
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𝐴 that nilsquares are not distinct from 0, but it is also the case that 0 is not the only one.
At 𝑡3 , Rudolf tries to block these two additions from entering 𝐴𝑐𝑐 and 𝐶𝐺 by claiming that
the utterance is incoherent. ‘Non-trivial nilsquares do not exist’ is added to 𝐴, but not 𝐴𝑐𝑐.
This is the moment where he asks Geoffrey a clarification question about nilsquares, and
challenges Geoffrey’s assumption that one can posit the existence of non-trivial nilsquares
without thereby engendering a contradiction.
At 𝑡4 , Geoffrey implies that because of his distinct negation meaning, the existence of such
nilsquares is not contradictory. He promotes to an available implication in CG that his logic,
connectives and mathematical system, are different from Rudolf’s. He also adds this assertion
to 𝐴. Here we see that Geoffrey and Rudolf must accommodate each other by changing a
fundamental assumption in the common ground, namely 𝐶𝐼𝑃. Even though the connectives
are homophonic in both systems, they cannot be treated as meaning the same thing in this
case. This is a radical change, but is necessary for the conversation to continue charitably.
𝐶𝐼𝑃 is removed from 𝐶𝐺.
At 𝑡5 , Rudolf accepts this. Propositions about the difference in connective meanings, logics,
and the existence of nilsquares are added to 𝐶𝐺. Geoffrey’s assertions that non-trivial
nilsquares exist in his system and that the negation connective does not entail that these are
contradictory are added to 𝐴𝑐𝑐 and 𝐶𝐺, and the proposition that SIA proves a fundamental
theorem is promoted to an available implication in 𝐶𝐺. All is well. We can make sense of this
conversation if we assume that the initial common ground was defective, in that it
contained 𝐶𝐼𝑃. By the end, Rudolf and Geoffrey have rectified this, and have discovered that
they both prove a theorem which looks like the fundamental theorem, but because of the
addition to the common ground that words which satisfy the antecedent of the 𝐶𝐼𝑃 do not
have to mean the same thing, ‘the’ theorem might not be the same theorem in both systems.
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Formalization of Conversation 2
I assume that 𝑡0 is the time before the first utterance, 𝑡1 the time of the first utterance and
𝑡3 the time of the last. 𝐼 is {JC, Greg}. At 𝑡0 , 𝐶𝐺 includes some basic information about
analysis and the proposition that both participants use different analysis systems and different
logics, and 𝐺𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚 , 𝑀, 𝐴, 𝑄, 𝑄𝑈𝐷, and 𝐴𝑐𝑐 are empty.
At 𝑡1 , JC adds the proposition that his system proves the fundamental theorem to 𝐴 and it is
also added to 𝐴𝑐𝑐, and promoted in 𝐶𝐺 to an available implication. At the same time, he adds
to 𝑄 the question of whether the other system proves the same theorem. It also gets added to
𝑄𝑈𝐷. JC’s goals at 𝑡1 include finding out whether Greg’s system proves the theorem.
At 𝑡2 , Greg answers the question affirmatively. The question posed by JC is removed from
𝑄𝑈𝐷 and the proposition that Greg’s system proved the fundamental theorem is promoted in
𝐶𝐺 to a simple, clear and straightforward theorem, and added to 𝐴 and 𝐴𝑐𝑐. JC’s goal of
finding out whether this new system proved the theorem has been satisfied. Additionally,
Greg adds new information to the 𝐶𝐺: that his system uses nilsquares to prove this theorem.
That is, he adds the propositions that his system licenses non-trivial nilsquares, and that nontrivial nilsquares are used in the proof of the fundamental theorem. He adds no new
questions.
At 𝑡3 , JC adds to the common ground that his system has no non-trivial nilsquares. This
proposition is promoted in 𝐶𝐺, and added to 𝐴 and 𝐴𝑐𝑐. Again, nothing said suggests the
common ground was defective, and so we can maintain that the logical connectives mean the
same thing in both logics. At the end of the day, 𝐶𝐼𝑃 ∈ 𝐶𝐺.

26

